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Statistical and Mathematical Modeling versus NHST?
There’s No Competition!

Joseph Lee Rodgers
University of Oklahoma
Some of Robinson & Levin’s critique of Rodgers (2010) is cogent, helpful, and insightful – although
limiting. Recent methodology has advanced through the development of structural equation modeling,
multi-level modeling, missing data methods, hierarchical linear modeling, categorical data analysis, as
well as the development of many dedicated and specific behavioral models. These methodological
approaches are based on a revised epistemological system, and have emerged naturally, without the need
for task forces, or even much self-conscious discussion. The original goal was neither to develop nor
promote a modeling revolution. That has occurred; I documented its development and its status. Two
organizing principles are presented that show how both perspectives can be reconciled and
accommodated. A program of research that could not have occurred within the standard NHST
epistemology, without a modeling perspective, is discussed. An historical and cross-disciplinary analogy
suggests their view is similar to Galileo’s world view, whereas some branches of social and behavioral
science may be ready for something closer to a Newtonian perspective.
Key words: NHST (or Null Hypothesis Significance Testing), Modeling, Mathematical ModelsD.
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of correcting the bad luck that can befall a
researcher in “gaming with the devil” (see Box,
1978, p. 144), and is another of Fisher‘s edicts
that helped create the philosophical basis of
social/behavioral science methodology.
I could (almost) leave this reply
hanging, and emphasize how correct and wellfounded are many of the positions stated in their
critique. If so, though, I would necessarily
conclude with some comments about how none
of these principles has any import in evaluating
either the status of NHST, or the development of
statistical/mathematical modeling, or as criticism
of my article, because these principles stand firm
in relation to either NHST or statistical/
mathematical modeling. However, if I left my
reply here, that would obfuscate my initial
intent,
which
I
believe
has
been
mischaracterized.
Two basic principles (and some
potential quibbles with the language, to follow)
are paramount, and within those principles their
criticisms and my position statements will be
simultaneously accommodated. The first
principle is that NHST is the type of statistical
paradigm that naturally applies to a rather
immature science, whereas statistical modeling
naturally fits a more mature, or at least maturing,
science. The second principle is that NHST is
subsumed within the modeling perspective. The
two paradigms need not compete, as Robinson
and Levin implied. Accept the modeling
perspective, and it can be sharpened to the
special case of the NHST perspective at any
time; insist that NHST is the one, only, and
proper epistemological position, and the full
range and power of structural equation modeling
(SEM), multi-level modeling (MLM), and
dozens of specialty models are relegated to
virtual impotence.

Introduction
Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST)
has, for many years, been the primary
organizational and epistemological system by
which we understand statistical practice in
behavioral sciences. NHST has been frequently
criticized, and in the late 1990s the criticism was
sufficient to create substantial contention,
explicit calls for NHST to be outlawed or
abandoned, the appointment of an American
Psychological Association task force to judge its
status and to evaluate proper statistical practice,
and a great deal of discussion and
argumentation, both informally and in published
articles. Before and during this same period, a
different epistemological system, what I referred
to in Rodgers (2010) as a modeling revolution
was in development. With little discussion (and
most of what would have naturally occurred has
been largely drowned out by the clamor over
NHST), mathematical and statistical modeling
have become the set of organizing principles that
has the potential to completely replace NHST as
the primary epistemological system. And
modeling should replace NHST, for several
reasons.
The first is because it is a more natural
way for researchers to frame, think about, and
conduct research, whereas NHST was a creation
of and for statisticians. Second, modeling has
more flexibility to support the maturation of
both statistical and methodological practice
within psychology and other behavioral
sciences. Third, modeling includes NHST as a
special case, and so NHST has not been replaced
or even very much revised as a set of procedure.
Robinson and Levin presented position
statements that, in my career, I have taught to
my students, and have applied in my research.
These principles emerged from a strong and
coherent philosophical background, including
caution
against
over-interpretation
of
correlations, which emerged from John Stuart
Mills’ (1843) inductive canons of scientific
inquiry. Another principle is to use
randomization if possible, which emerged from
Fisher’s (1935) answer to the problem that Mill
left open -- how can researchers equate groups,
on average, before a manipulation? Yet another
is to emphasize the importance of replication;
this underappreciated practice serves the purpose

Statistical Modeling Reflects and Supports the
Maturation of Social/Behavioral Sciences
The development of statistical and
mathematical modeling as an epistemological
system didn’t occur through high-level mandate
or management; it has been a natural and
emergent methodological feature of the maturing
of psychology (and has parallels within
education, economics, sociology, and other
social/behavioral sciences). In this sense, it is a
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can also be used to separate family-based
selection bias from parental and family
influence; see D’Onofrio, 2003, for description
of the children-of-twins design and Rodgers, et
al, 2008, for description of the mother-daughteraunt-niece design). Rodgers, et al. (2000)
showed how selection bias has improperly
influenced the interpretation of birth orderintelligence links; at least most (perhaps all) of
what has appeared to be birth order effects on
intelligence in past research has actually been
between-family differences in parental education
and IQ, among others (see Rodgers, 2001 for
further explanation of this logic, Wichman, et
al., 2006, for a modeling demonstration of this
phenomenon, and Wichman, et al., 2007, for
further elaboration). D’Onofrio, et al. (2008)
showed how the link between smoking during
pregnancy and child conduct problems is at least
partially caused by the kind of women who
smoke during pregnancy, thus challenging much
of the direct causal attribution.
D’Onofrio, et al. (2009) used a similar
design to investigate the relationship between
family income and child conduct problems, with
similar conclusions. Mendle, et al. (2009)
applied this type of sibling control to study the
link between father absence and age at first
intercourse, and found that much of the apparent
direct link between father absence and age at
first intercourse has likely been caused by shared
genetic factors in the background. Harden, et al.
(2009) studied whether population density has a
direct influence on antisocial behavior during
adolescence, or whether the apparent link is due
to selection bias; the latter was more strongly
supported. Finally, Jaffee, et al. (2011) showed
how placement of infants and young children in
day care as an influence on both achievement
and behavioral problem scores in childhood is
almost completely attributable to the type of
women who put their children in day care,
leaving very little remaining variance to attribute
to the direct influence of the day care experience
in and of itself on these child outcomes.
For the purposes of this reply, these
findings make a strong statement about both
modeling and NHST. Each result above
depended on strong design logic combined with
a statistical modeling exercise. Further, each
study contained within it a number of NHST

mischaracterization to claim that I “condemn”
NHST or that I “perceive vices of statistical
hypothesis testing.” Most of my article was not
prescriptive, despite their suggestions to the
contrary; the part that is prescriptive has little to
do with liking or condemning NHST. Rather, I
described a developmental process that is well
advanced, though relatively unexamined in
historical perspective. As science has advanced,
stronger statements are possible, ones that even
in some cases move toward legitimate causal
attribution. Nowhere in that previous sentence is
there encouragement to assert unjustified
causality. Further, to suggest that such
unjustified claims occur – even to illustrate with
specific examples – does no damage to the
position that our science is maturing in that
direction. Nor is science necessarily advanced
by successful causal claims; sometimes, rather,
it advances by identifying past mis-attributions,
a process which Robinson and Levin support
and appreciate. Ironically, though, certain
versions of that process would not likely emerge
from an NHST perspective. I described an
example from my own research program.
For many years, nearly an entire
community of research psychologists has
ignored a certain type of selection bias, resulting
in the kind of mis-attributed causal process that
Robinson & Levin (and I) decry. Scarr and
McCartney (1983) made a stark statement
concerning this design flaw, which is inherent in
literally hundreds (perhaps thousands) of
previous published papers: “passive genotypeenvironment effects arise in biologically related
families and render all of the research literature
on parent-child socialization uninterpretable” (p.
427). Using a quasi-experimental design that
takes advantage of siblings to partially control
for selection bias, along with a powerful sibling
dataset, my colleagues and I have published a
series of articles during the past decade that have
separated and quantified the difference between
certain types of inherent selection bias and the
remaining correlational links, within which the
causal attributions are logically expected to
exist.
I review several of these studies based
on the sibling design and on the children-ofsiblings design. (Besides these, other quasiexperimental design innovations exist that also
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otherwise providing any type of institutional
control over NHST (or any other methodology).
I have used the NHST paradigm often, in most
of my published research. I have also used
modeling approaches, when they appeared to be
useful and appropriate.
Many of my publications incorporated
both, which leads to my third comment: I do
become prescriptive when I describe in detail
how the statistical modeling strategy subsumes
NHST, because I’m convinced of the value of
both approaches. Hence, the crux of my reply:
NHST is a proper paradigm, but it is a special
case of a broader and thus more flexible
paradigm. I do not agree there are two
competing approaches. One is broader and one
is a special case. The modeling approach uses
NHST as a fundamental part of the modeling
framework. As Rodgers (2010) explained:

results, but the organizational principles
emerged from a research perspective that
required longitudinal and within-family data,
strong research designs, powerful measurement
tools, and sophisticated statistical models. They
would not have likely emerged from an NHST
epistemology. Nor are the conclusions that
emerge from this type of work necessarily
causal; indeed, most of the conclusions above
challenge previous causal attributions.
In the tradition of Cook and Campbell
(1979) and Shadish, et al. (2002), the
researchers’ goal, whether in quasi-experimental
or experiment research, is to address as many
threats as possible to internal validity, the
validity of causal attribution, and to admit freely
and to self-evaluate in the face of those that
remain. Robinson and Levin admitted to this
maturational challenge: “Our field of
educational psychology is filled with such
examples of comparing new innovations with
ridiculous strawperson control conditions that no
sane researcher would ever consider using.” So
are psychology, sociology, etc., of course. And
so the proper and defensible approach is exactly
where they stated it should be, using an
appropriate set of methodological tools to draw
cautious but legitimate conclusions, and to avoid
wasting time asking superficial and uninteresting
questions. Hopefully, those methodological tools
expand to accommodate improvements,
maturation, in the science that they support.
Statistical modeling is an example of such
expansion.

As the two models ... are evaluated, no
chance-level null hypothesis is posited,
nor is an alternative constructed, at least
not in the sense that those concepts are
usually treated. However, traditional
statistical concepts are used in this
comparison, such as a test statistic (e.g.,
Chi-square
values),
a
sampling
distribution (the theoretical chi-square),
and an alpha level (to tune the trade-off
between fit and parsimony). Further, the
NHST perspective is embedded within
this statistical evaluation in the sense
that there is a null hypothesis built into
the model comparison (i.e., whether the
population parameters ... are equal to
one another). (p. 7)

Statistical Modeling Subsumes NHST
There exists a way to view both NHST
and statistical modeling that accommodates both
Rodgers (2010) and Robinson and Levin's
critique. That accommodation was stated in my
original article, but here I shall present this
argument in different words. Robinson and
Levin presumed I was prescriptively criticizing
NHST; that I favor modeling and oppose NHST:
“Rodgers (2010) has written a cogent essay on
what he perceives as the vices of statistical
hypothesis testing and the virtues of statistical
modeling.” First, my article was intended to be
more of an historical account than a desideratum
about what should be. Second, I was a strong
opponent of outlawing, abandoning, or

NHST is a tool, as a way to answer a certain
question. I’ve never understood why researchers
would be satisfied with the conclusion to reject
Ho or fail to reject Ho, unless the research
question was simple enough to warrant such a
conclusion. It seems to me that when the
research questions become more complex,
modeling has the potential to provide more
complex answers, and to move scientific
epistemology forward substantially further than
what can be obtained via NHST.
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union should decide to ban hammers or electric
saws). Second, NHST has served its value in
thousands of scientific settings. It has also been
misused, and Robinson and Levin provided
support for its proper and legitimate use, in this
and other published articles.
Regarding “the ‘revolution’ about which
Rodgers writes is neither quiet nor
methodological,” they were correct, as I
originally asserted. The NHST hullabaloo was
anything but quiet. But the modeling revolution
was so quiet that apparently many didn’t notice,
and now aren’t sure that it occurred. Robinson
and Levin contend that the revolution was not
methodological, that the issues are entirely
statistical. SEM contains both a structural and a
measurement model. Multi-level modeling
accounts for clustering, which is often caused by
sampling processes. Multilevel modeling also
cannot be separated from the design issues that
generated the different levels. Analytic
procedures that handle missing data require
specification of the generating processes –
sampling, measurement, etc. – that produced the
missing values. In other words, modern
statistical models account for design, sampling,
and measurement, as well as the formal
statistical properties of statistical models. As one
example, MacCallum and Tucker (1991) could
not have developed their conceptualization
separating sampling and model error if they had
used an NHST epistemology.
It is perhaps not surprising that those
whose way of thinking about the advancement
of behavioral science is embedded in the NHST
tradition would not recognize the modeling
revolution as bringing about the expansion of
statistical practice to include many other features
of the methodological arena. But such
broadening is one among many features of
statistical/mathematical modeling that make the
use of SEM, MLM, missing data approaches,
and other modeling methods exciting and useful.
To expand their analogy, there are new dangers
created in using models, and their misuse cannot
be supported (Cliff, 1983). The danger is
analogous to learning how to use electric saws,
when hand saws used to be the state-of-the-art.
We can either decry electric saws, or teach their
proper and safe use. One of premier psychology
quantitative journals is called Psychological

Minor Issues
There are some mischaracterizations in
their critique that require a response (though the
majority are accounted for by the two principles
in the previous sections). They suggested that
“he then goes on to discuss NHST as a hybrid
and condemns it;” I did not, though I cited
Gigerenzer (1993), who did. They implied that I
supported a ban on NHST, when I actually
opposed such a ban. They claimed that “Rodgers
also condemns the NHST ‘jurisprudence
model,” whereas in fact I teach and promote this
way of thinking of NHST. They suggested that
“Rodgers mischaracterizes Tukey’s ‘exploratory
data analysis’ strategy insofar as the detective
nature of that hypothesis-generating approach
clearly is not jurisprudence,” but I did not link
the detective and jurisprudence components –
after describing the role of jurisprudence within
research, I stated “The researcher is also a
detective” (p. 3, italics added for emphasis).
They failed to make the connection that my
section titled “Criticism and Adjustment of
NHST” was historical; their first sentence in
their section “The Null Hypothesis Hullabaloo”
recognized historical goals, but the remainder of
that section was not about the “hullabaloo,” but
rather about their perception that I promulgated
it, although I did not. Finally, they suggested
that “he gives short shrift to approaches that
have defended reasonable and proper
applications of statistical hypothesis testing,”
and cited four articles that would have provided
more balance. In fact, I discussed three of those
articles.
NHST is a worthy, valuable, and useful
tool. It helps researchers to answer a certain
question, framed in a certain way. However, its
weaknesses are well-known, and often discussed
(see Wainer, 1999, for a balanced and interesting
account, among dozens of others). Further, as
the field of behavioral science matures, it should
not stand as the epistemological basis of
research methodology within the field of
psychological science, because modeling is
more useful, flexible, and better supports the
future of behavioral science research.
This methodological practice should not
be banned or outlawed for two reasons. First,
such practice should not be managed at the
institutional level (any more than the workers’
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moved on beyond the question of whether the
Copernican system could be rejected or not.
Kepler, in 1609 and 1619, published his
three laws of planetary motion, and Newton
(who was born in 1642, the year that Galilio
died), published in 1687 his Principia, stating
formal mathematical models of motion and the
universal law of gravity. These “laws” stepped
up to a new epistemological level, using
previous observations as the basis for
mathematical models that were designed to
subsume many previous disparate and separate
astronomical observations. (The development of
the double-helix model of DNA is another
example in a different discipline in which
disparate observations were brought together
inductively using mathematical modeling.)
To bring these historical references to
the current discussion, Robinson and Levin
wrote: “we agree that - in the field of education we have enough theory development studies and
need more studies that address practical ‘what
works‘ questions.” Fair enough. They argued
that in many domains of our immature science
more knowledge is needed, that more
educational and psychological telescopes need to
be brought to bear on current problems. Nothing
in my own teaching, thinking, or research
practice holds anything but praise and agreement
for such a position. Indeed, two of my primary
courses over the past 30+ years of teaching have
been
Exploratory
Data
Analysis
and
Quantitative Methods in Evaluation Research,
where students learn to engage exactly this kind
of goal, to address practical "what works"
questions.
Then, they stated, “It is our fear that a
research approach where the question ‘Does the
data fit my model?’ is far more dangerous than
the question ‘Is there anything here worth
pursuing?’” Again, fair enough. Without
knowledge, both scientists and those who
consume the science (policymakers, the public,
etc.) can be led to the modern equivalent of the
geocentric universe, and there is indeed danger
in promulgating positions both pro and con in
the absence of adequate knowledge, or even
with substantial knowledge when that
knowledge is at odds with societal expectations
(just ask Galilio!). But does such lurking danger
excuse statisticians and methodologists from

Methods, and publishes articles on design,
sampling, measurement, and statistics, as well as
how these different areas overlap and inform one
another.
Conclusion
Consider an analogy from the history of science
to illustrate the points made in my response. The
analogy draws on two popular science books,
Sobel (2000) and Gleick (2003). The late 16th
and early 17th century occupied a remarkable
period of scientific ascendancy in the field of
astronomy. In 1543, Copernicus offered the
insightful (yet heretical) view that the earth
revolved around the sun, rather than vice versa.
Galileo was born shortly after, and as Sobel
noted, “All his [Galilio’s] observations lent
credence to the unpopular sun-centered universe
of Nicolas Copernicus, which had been
introduced over half a century previously, but
foundered on lack of evidence” (p. 7). The
observations to which Sobel referred were of
course obtained with Galilio‘s new invention,
the telescope, through which he observed the
moons of Jupiter, the face of earth’s moon, and
the sunspots moving across the face of the sun.
Such observations were, in modern language,
exploratory evidence in support of a previously
proposed theory.
Although probabilistic reasoning was
still in its infancy (and was being developed by
Fermat and Pascal in France during the same
historical epoch), the epistemological basis of
scientific inquiry in astronomy during that
period was similar to that in psychology during
the 20th century. The NHST paradigm that
Robinson & Levin vigorously defended was
similar to the one used by Galileo and others
during the period of time in which they were
collecting information (using telescopes and
otherwise). Ultimately, such information of
course inductively coheres into theoretical
propositions. Galileo offered multiple sources of
astronomical evidence for a heliocentric view of
the solar system, including the movement of
sunspots, the eclipses of the moons of Jupiter,
and the tides on earth. Each might be viewed as
a separate astronomical significance test of the
null hypothesis that the earth was at the center of
the universe, a hypothesis that we have
ultimately rejected. But astronomy quickly
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developing proper tools, perspectives, and whole
epistemological systems to support the
development and evaluation of such models?
My answer, strongly implied throughout
the original article, is indeed not. Both the
NHST epistemology they promoted for
relatively immature science, and the one that
they view as dangerous, the modeling approach,
should exist side-by-side within the arena of
quantitative methods in both education and
psychology. I promoted the development of the
latter, not erasing the former. The former can
only be criticized when it purports to serve the
function of the latter. What is dangerous is
asking NHST to provide methodological support
beyond that for which it was designed. NHST
can answer the question, “Is the null hypothesis
plausible, or not?” It was not designed to answer
the question, “Which of these two competing
mathematical models is preferable in the way
that it handles the trade-off between fit and
parsimony?” In areas of behavioral science that
are ready for more strongly confirmatory
research – including the development of
mathematical and statistical models that contain
both causal and explanatory components (which
are, of course, not entirely the same thing) –
NHST is naturally expanded into the broader
modeling epistemology. That expansion was the
subject of my article. The earlier view of NHST
as providing epistemological support for
important but often separate and disparate
individual findings is the topic of Robinson and
Levin’s criticism. Both stand effectively before
criticism.
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